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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J O H N M. R A P P , dba R A P P 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. { Case No. 
13552 
SALT L A K E CITY, a municipal 
corporation; and M A R R I O T T 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Brief of Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake City 
N A T U R E OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt 
Lake County, granting Defendant-Respondent, Salt 
Lake City, Summary Judgment and dismissing the 
Complaint as to Defendant, Marriott Corporation. At 
the hearing on the motion for Summary Judgment, 
Respondent Salt Lake City contended that Appellant 
1 
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was barred from bringing his suit against Salt Lake 
City by the doctrine of Governmental Immunity which, 
under the facts of this case, has not been waived by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-1 et 
seq., Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. 
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
The lower Court granted Summary Judgment as 
to Respondent Salt Lake City based upon its conten-
tion of governmental immunity at the hearing of the 
motion and after memoranda were filed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On or about November 30, 1972, the City did enter 
into a "Lease and Concession Agreement" with Airline 
Foods, Inc., which is a subsidiary of Defendant Marriott 
Corporation. Pursuant to the terms of said Agree-
ment, real property located at the Salt Lake City In-
ternational Airport was leased to Airline Foods for the 
purpose of operating an in-flight catering kitchen upon 
the demised premises. I t was agreed that Salt Lake 
City was to construct "at its expense" a building or 
buildings on the premises for use as an in-flight cater-
ing kitchen in accordance with plans and specifications 
prepared by Airline Foods and approved by the Salt 
Lake City Engineer. I t was agreed that the City's ex-
pense was limited by the following provision: 
"Lessor shall pay for the 'cost of the project'. 
Provided that in the event the 'cost of the project' 
2 
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shall exceed the total sum of Five Hundred Fifty 
Thousand ($550,000) Dollars, the Lessee shall 
promptly pay Lessor upon demand the amount 
by which the 'cost of the project' exceeds such 
sum and which is the result of change orders and 
other amendments and supplements to the con-
struction contract or contracts issued or executed 
by Lessor at the written request of and approved 
by Lessee " 
On or about April 26, 1973, Salt Lake City mailed 
to two contractor's associations, Associated General 
Contractors of America, 1135 South West Temple 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Intermountain Con-
tractors, P . O. Box 1829, Salt Lake City, Utah, a 
Notice to Contractors requesting bids on the project. 
(A copy of which is set out in full text in Appendix.) 
On or about May 30, 1973, Salt Lake City caused the 
said Notice to Contractors to be published in the Des-
eret News, a newspaper of general circulation in Salt 
Lake City. (A copy of said notice is set out in full text 
in Appendix.) No Notice of Invitation for Bids was 
sent to individual contractors and no individual con-
tractor was requested to submit a bid, contrary to what 
is implied in Appellant's Brief under "Statement of the 
Facts" on page three. In response to the Invitation for 
Bids, three bids were received, i.e., Bodell Construction 
Company in the amount of $718,114.00, Rapp Con-
struction Company (Appellant), in the amount of 
$648,888.00 and J .J .G. Construction Company, (here-
inafter referred to as "J.J.G.") in the amount of $540,-
000.000. The preliminary estimate made by the Salt 
Lake City Engineer's Office was in the amount of 
3 
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$650,000.00. Following the opening of the bids on May 
17, 1973, the low bid submitted by J .J .G. in the amount 
of $540,000.00 was accepted by the Salt Lake City 
Board of Commissioners. 
The obligations of Airline Foods under said Lease 
and Concession Agreement were guaranteed by De-
fendant Marriott Corporation and the said Agreement 
did contain a provision that Marriott Corporation 
would be permitted to bid on all or any portion of the 
construction work. I t is believed by Respondent, Salt 
Lake City, that J .J .G. is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Defendant Marriott Corporation. 
After the said Lease was approved by the Salt Lake 
City Board of Commissioners, it was duly filed of 
record with the Salt Lake City Recorder's Office, pur-
suant to Sec. 10-10-61, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, which record was, as required by law, open 
to the inspection of all interested persons. 
P O I N T I 
P L A I N T I F F ' S ACTION IS B A R R E D 
BY G O V E R N M E N T A L I M M U N I T Y 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it has 
always been the law that no private action for tort will 
lie against a municipality for an act or acts committed 
while such municipality is performing a governmental 
function. Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 U. 573, 111 
P.2d 800 (1941). See also: Davis v. Provo, 1 U.2d 
i 
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244, 265 P.2d 415 (1953) ; Cobia v. Roy City, 12 U.2d 
375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961) ; and Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake 
City, 13 U.2d 214,371 P.2d 211 (1962). 
The right to institute an action is purely statutory 
since it did not exist at common law and is strictly a 
legislative function. As Justice Wolfe stated in his con-
curring opinion in the Niblock case: 
"However, since the decision of this court has 
steadfastly refused to so limit the doctrine, the 
prevailing rule must continue to be the law until 
the Legislature sees fit to change it." Niblock v. 
Salt Lake, supra, at p. 805. 
In 1965 the Utah Legislature saw fit to enact the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-1, et 
seq., Utah Code Ann,, 1953, as amended, waiving gov-
ernmental immunity in certain cases. However, only 
in those cases specifically waived by the Act is a plain-
tiff allowed to bring a suit against a municipality. The 
Act must clearly be applied to preserve sovereign im-
munity and waive it only as clearly expressed. Hope 
v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 U.2d 4, 51lP.2d 
1286 (1973). 
Sec. 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities shall be immune 
from suit for any injury which may result from 
the activities of said entities wherein said entity 
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function." 
5 
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As to negligent acts of employees, Sec. 63-30-10, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, provides for a 
waiver of immunity, except in eleven specified cases, 
two of which have application to the case at hand. The 
first is: "[When the claim] arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function, whether or not the discretion is 
abused, . . ." Sec. 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
as amended. 
The funds for the construction of the in-flight 
kitchen, subject of this suit, were obtained from the issu-
ance of bonds which are to be paid from revenue de-
rived from the Salt Lake City International Airport, 
and, as such, are a "special fund" to be used for a special 
purpose. Under the "Special Fund" doctrine, there is 
no requirement that a contract for the construction of a 
building be let through competitive bidding. See, Utah 
Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 U. 203, 74 P.2d 
1191 (1937). The statute requiring competitive bid-
ding only requires such: 
"Whenever the board of commissioners . . . of any 
city . . . shall contemplate making any new im-
provement to be paid for out of the general funds 
of the city, . . ." Sec. 10-7-20, Utah Code Ann., 
1953. (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, the advertising for bids in this case was com-
pletely within the discretion of the City since it was not 
obligated so to do by statute. Velasquez v. Union Pac. 
BR., 24 U.2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970). The City has 
the right, without the requirement, to make certain that 
6 
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it was obtaining the best price for the project. Hence, 
the City was exercising a discretionary function and can-
not be sued ''whether or not the discretion is abused." 
See, Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 26 U.2d 78, 484 P.2d 
1200 (1971). 
The second and more compelling reason that suit 
cannot be maintained in this instance is found in Sub-
section (6) which says that immunity from suit is not 
waived if the injury "arises out of a misrepresentation 
by said employee whether or not such is negligent or 
intentional." Sec .63-30-10(6), Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
as amended. As this Section clearly states, a suit can-
not be maintained against a municipal corporation for 
injury caused by misrepresentations made by its em-
ployees while performing a governmental function. See, 
Boyce v. State of Utah, 26 U.2d 138, 486 P.2d 387 
(1971). Misrepresentation is one of the basic elements 
of Appellant's claim against Respondent, Salt Lake 
City Corporation, as will be noted in Paragraphs 6 and 
7 of Appellant's Complaint. For such misrepresenta-
tions, whether negligent or intentional, by commission 
or omission, if any actually occurred, Appellant can-
not maintain his action as it is barred by governmental 
immunity. 
That the action taken in this matter was a govern-
mental function cannot be disputed. This Court has so 
held in the case of Wade v. Salt Lake City, 10 U.2d 
374, 353 P.2d 914 (1960). This Court held that the op-
eration and the maintenance of an airport is performed 
as a governmental function. Therein this Court held: 
7 
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"We are aware of the diversity of respectable 
authority heading in almost all directions anent 
interpretations of statutes dealing with airport 
operation. The variegation ably is treated in 66 
A.L.R. 2d 634. We prefer to conclude that our 
statutes have spoken rather clearly and emphat-
ically in favor of tagging the operation of airports 
in this state by state political subdivisions under 
statutory authority as being accomplished in a 
governmental capacity, and until it is alleged and 
justified as an operation either sanctioned by dif-
frent future legislation, the municipal airport at 
Salt Lake City must be held to be operating 
under such capacity." (Emphasis added) Wade 
v. Salt Lake City, supra, at p. 915. 
P O I N T I I 
T H I S ACTION IS B A S E D ON T O R T A N D 
NOT U P O N I M P L I E D CONTRACT. 
In an attempt to circumvent governmental im-
munity, Appellant alleges some sort of a warranty 
based upon some wildly concocted implied contract. 
There can be no implied contract with Salt Lake City 
for the following reasons: 
1. T H E O N L Y M E T H O D OF C O N T R A C T I N G 
IS BY ACTION OF T H E BOARD O F COM-
M I S S I O N E R S A N D MUST BE COUNTER-
S I G N E D BY T H E C I T Y R E C O R D E R . 
The general rule of law is that a municipality may 
not be obligated on an implied contract. When em-
ployees of the City of Akron, Ohio, petitioned the 
court for an award of overtime pay based upon implied 
contract, the court held: 
8 
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"What the plaintiff is doing in this case is turn-
ing that promise into an implied promise to pay 
in the event that he is unable to use all his ac-
cumulated overtime, but it has been held time and 
again that the only manner in which a municipal-
ity may enter into a contract, agreement or ob-
ligation is by ordinance or resolution of its coun-
cil. There can therefore be no contract, agree-
ment or obligation against a municipality and 
no implied liability. All liability ex contractu 
must be expressed and be entered into by ordin-
ance or resolution of the council." (Emphasis 
added) Zehenni v. City of Akron, 19 Ohio Misc. 
11,250N.E. 2d 630, 632 (1968). 
This Court stated the same proposition thusly: 
"Every person contracting with a municipal 
corporation, or one who proposes to enter into a 
contract with such corporation, is bound to take 
notice of the provision of the city ordinances and 
any limitations therein contained. In the case be-
fore us, while the plaintiff was misled into think-
ing that it had entered into a contract with the 
defendant, it was nevertheless charged with 
knowledge that the proposed contract was with-
out binding effect until it was approved by the 
governing body of the city." (Emphasis added) 
Thatcher Chemical Company v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 21 U.2d 355, 445 P.2d 769, 771 (1968). 
The ordinance which the Court referred to in the 
Thatcher case and upon which is based its reason for so 
holding was, in part: 
". . . that no liability against Salt Lake City in 
excess of one hundred fifty dollars shall be 
created by the commissioner of any statutory de-
9 
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partment without sanction of the board of com-
missioners first had and approved, . . . . Except 
as herein provided, no person other than the board 
of commissioners shall create any liability against 
the city." Sec. 24-1-15, Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965. 
This ordinance is still in effect; therefore, the only 
method by which Salt Lake City can enter into a con-
tract is by sanction of the Board of Commissioners. 
A further provision of the Salt Lake City Revised 
Ordinances requires: 
"He [city recorder] shall countersign all con-
tracts made in behalf of the city, and every con-
tract made in behalf of the city or to which the 
city is a party shall be void unless signed by the 
recorder." (Emphasis added) Sec. 25-16-6, Re-
vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965. 
This section of the Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances 
was enacted pursuant to the mandate of the Utah Leg-
islature, Section 10-10-61, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, which requires: 
"He [city recorder] shall countersign all con-
tracts made on behalf of the city, and every con-
tract made on behalf of the city or to which the 
city is a party shall be void unless signed by the 
recorder. He shall maintain a record of all con-
tracts, properly indexed, which record shall be 
open to the inspection of all interested persons.9' 
(Emphasis added). 
I t has been said that where there is a charter pro-
vision or a statute or ordinance prescribing the method 
by which an officer or agent of a municipal corporation 
10 
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may bind the municipality by contract, that method must 
be followed and there can be no implied contract or 
implied liability of the municipality under such circum-
stance. 
"Many cases hold that if a statute or the charter 
requires certain express contracts of a municipal-
ity to be preceded by certain steps or to be made 
in a certain way, and expressly or impliedly for-
bids the execution of such contracts in any other 
way, then no implied contract can arise when the 
expressed contract is invalid for failure to comply 
with such statutory or charter provisions, nor 
where, in the absence of an express contract, the 
implied contract would have come within such 
statute if it had been expressed. The fiction of 
an implied promise or agreement, on the theory 
of the liability based on quantum meruit, cannot 
be substituted for an expressed contract which is 
void for non-compliance with mandatory terms 
of the statute or charter." 10 Mun. Corp., Mc-
Quillin, Sec. 29.112, p. 544. 
A myriad of cases have stated this proposition, 
only a few of which are quoted as follows: 
"Where there is a statute or ordinance prescrib-
ing the method by which an officer or agent of 
a municipal corporation may bind the municipal-
ity by contract, that method must be followed, 
and there can be no implied contract or implied 
liability of such municipality. Where the agents 
of a city are restricted by law as to the methods 
of contracting, the city cannot be bound otherwise 
than by compliance with the conditions prescribed 
for the exercise of power." (Emphasis added) 
W acker-W abash Corp. v. City of Chicago, 350 
111. App. 343, 112 N.E.2d 903, 908 (1953). 
11 
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The California Supreme Court said: 
"The contract whose validity plaintiff seeks to 
establish was not signed by the city manager as 
the charter requires. I t could not have been 
signed since the area to be included was never de-
fined nor approved by the city attorney or the 
council. I t is well settled that when a municipal 
charter contains an express limitation upon the 
mode in which the city may contract, the city is 
bound only by contracts executed in accordance 
with the charter provisions \ in other words, where 
the statute provides the only mode by which the 
power of the contract shall be exercised, the mode 
is the measure of the power. (Cases cited) The 
rule applies equally to contracts made by the city 
in a governmental or proprietary function. (Cases 
cited) When the charter provision has not been 
complied with, the city may not be held liable in 
quasi contract, and it will not be estopped to deny 
the validity of the contract. (Cases cited)" (Em-
phasis added) Dynamic Industries Co. v. City of 
Long Beach, 323 P.2d 768, 771 (1958). 
In the case of Satroin v. City of Grand Forks, 159 
Cal. App. 2d 294, 163 N.W. 2d 522 (1968), the court 
stated, at p. 527: 
"Where the statute expressly permits the City to 
contract only upon the governing body's author-
ization, and further provides that a contract be 
executed on the part of the City by its executive 
officer and by the city auditor, no valid contract 
exists where such statutory requirements have 
not been complied with. . . . But where the sta-
tute expressly fixes certain requirements for ex-
ecution of a contract, we do not believe municipal 
officers can ignore such requirements and create 
12 
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an implied contract by their conduct since muni' 
cipal contrcats must be executed in accordance 
with statutory requirements" (Emphasis added) 
Courts have also held that this is the case even 
though benefits are conferred upon the municipality by 
completion of the contract. 
"Where a contract is made by a municipal corp-
oration which is not warranted by the statutory 
authority conferred upon it, the governing body 
of the corporation has at all times the right to 
treat the contract as void and refuse compliance 
therewith. A reason frequently advanced in sup-
port of this rule is that since the powers of a 
municipal corporation are wholly statutory, 
every person who deals with such a body is bound 
to know the extent of its authority and limitations 
in its powers. I t is generally held that when a 
contract has been entered into by a municipal 
corporation with respect to a subject matter 
which was not within its corporate powers, or 
which it is authorized to make only under pre-
scribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, 
or in a prescribed mode or manner, the corpor-
ation cannot be held liable on the contract regard-
less of whether the other party thereto has fully 
carried out its part of the agreement. The corp-
orate powers of such a corporation cannot be 
extended by the doctrine of estoppel. (Emphasis 
added) Hoboken Local No. 2, etc. v. City of 
Hoboken, 133 N . J . L . 334, U A.2d 329, 332 
(1945). 
" I t may sometimes seem a hardship upon a con-
tractor that all compensation for work done, etc., 
should be denied him; but it should be remem-
bered that he, no less than the officer of the corp-
13 
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oration, when he deals in a matter expressly pro-
vided for in the charter, is bound to see to it that 
the charter is complied with. If he neglects this, 
or chooses to take the hazard, he is a mere volun-
teer, and suffers only what he ought to have an-
ticipated." Dynamic Ind. Co. v. Long Beach, 
supra, at p. 772. 
I t is generally accepted practice that a contractor sub-
mitting a bid is a mere volunteer and there is no antici-
pation on the part of the contractor that he will be paid 
for his costs in preparing the bid if his bid is not ac-
cepted. 
One mandatory requirement prescribed by the State 
Legislature and carried out in the City Ordinances is 
that all contracts must be countersigned by the City 
Recorder in order for them to be valid. If this is not done 
such contract is void. 
"Countersignature of a municipal contract by a 
particular officer is essential to its enforcement 
where the statute requiring it is mandatory." 63 
C.J.S. Mun. Corp. §1007 (c), p. 593. 
As was stated in the Thatcher case, every person 
contracting with the City is bound to take notice of the 
provision that no contract can be entered into except be 
it sanctioned by the Governing Body and countersigned 
by the City Recorder. For this reason, no implied con-
tract can be formed if it is for an amount exceeding one 
hundred fifty dollars or if it is not countersigned by the 
City Recorder. Even if such contract is formed, because 
it is claimed that it was sanctioned by the Board of 
Commissioners because of some action which they may 
14 
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have taken, then such contract is void for want of count-
ersignature by the City Recorder. 
2. T H E R E CAN B E NO I M P L I E D CON-
TRACT B E C A U S E T H E R E W A S NO CON-
S I D E R A T I O N GIVEN. 
I t is a well settled rule that a contract must have 
consideration and that in order to be binding each party 
must give some legal consideration to the other by con-
ferring the benefit upon him or suffering a legal detri-
ment at his request. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 U.2d 433, 361 
P.2dl77 (1961). 
Salt Lake City did not give to Appellant: "Ten 
Dollars and other good and valuable consideration." I t 
did not give One Dollar, not One Cent, nor did it give 
even a peppercorn. All that was promised on the part 
of Salt Lake City was that it would consider the bid of 
Appellant. If "A" says to " B " : "If you will give me a 
price at which you will sell your horse, I will consider 
it." Do you have a binding contract? No! The promise 
to consider the offer is not sufficient consideration. 
Salt Lake City did not in any way obligate itself 
by requesting bids. I t could reject all bids including 
plaintiff's and J .J .G. Construction Company's (the 
low bid and that bid which was accepted) if it so desired, 
and it was so designated in the request for bids. (See 
Notice to Contractors in Appendix). Salt Lake City 
was not required to accept Plaintiff's bid even if it had 
been the lowest responsible bid (which it was not). As 
discussed under Point I, the funds from which the in-
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flight kitchen were to be constructed are special funds 
and under the "Special Fund" doctrine there is no re-
quirement to advertise for bids. Utah Power and Light 
Co. v. Provo, supra. Therefore, no statute requires the 
City to accept the lowest responsible bid. In the absence 
of a statute requiring acceptance of "the lowest respons-
ible bid," a municipality need not let to such bidder if it 
merely adopts a policy of advertising for bids. Under 
such conditions it may let to a higher bidder or to none 
at all as it so desires. Lee v. City of Ames, 199 Iowa 
1342, 203 N.W. 790 (1925) ; Archambault v. Mayor of 
Lowell, 278 Mass. 327, 180 N.E. 157 (1932). 
The court in the Archambault case stated, at p. 159: 
"In the absence of the not unusual provision re-
quiring contracts to be awarded the lowest re-
sponsible bidder such a requirement is not to be 
implied, but it is to be inferred that the awarding 
of the contracts is left to the reasonable judg-
ment of the municipal officers charged with the 
responsibility therefor. (Cases cited)." 
The Lee case held, at p. 793: 
"I t is well settled that a municipal corporation 
need not, in making its contracts, advertise for 
bids and let to the lowest bidder in the absence of 
an express statutory requirement, and where a 
city is not required to advertise for bids, neither 
is it required to let to the lowest bidder, in case it 
does adopt such course. (20 Enc. of Law (2d 
Ed.) 1165, and cases cited." 
Herein lies part of the difference between the case 
at hand and the case cited by Appellant, Heyer Pro-
ducts Co. v. U.S., (Ct. CI. 1956) 140 F . Supp. 409. 
16 
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In the Heyer case the government was required by sta-
tute to accept the bid "most advantageous to the gov-
ernment price and other factors considered." 41 U.S. 
Code Ann., Sec. 152. I t was on the basis that Heyer's 
bid was the "most advantageous to the government," 
that the court found some sort of an implied contract 
which conferred upon the bidder certain rights. That 
case was referred back to the trial court and when at 
trial the trial court found Heyer's bid to be defective and 
not "the most advantageous to the government," the 
Court of Claims then held that Heyer was not entitled 
to collect for his costs in preparing the bid. Heyer 
Products Co., Inc. v. U.S., (Ct. of CI. 1959) 177 F . 
Supp. 251. Hence, the consideration in the Heyer case 
upon which the court based an implied contract was the 
implied promise: 
"However, we said that by the solicitation for 
bids, the Government impliedly promised that it 
would give honest and fair consideration to all 
bids received and would not reject any one of 
them arbitrarily or capriciously, but would award 
the contract to that bidder whose bid in its honest 
judgment was most advantageous to the Govern-
ment." Heyer Products Co., Inc. v. U.S., supra, 
at p. 252. 
In the instant case there was no such obligation, no 
implied promise to let the contract to the bidder whose 
bid was most advantageous to the government nor to 
the lowest responsible bidder, but any and all bids could 
be rejected; hence, the only promise given was that the 
bid would be considered and that is not sufficient con-
sideration upon which to base an implied contract. 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P O I N T I I I 
A D V E R T I S I N G F O R A N D R E C E I V I N G B I D S 
C R E A T E S NO I M P L I E D CONTRACT A N D A 
R E J E C T E D B I D D E R H A S NO S T A N D I N G . 
I t should be noted that Appellant cites several cases 
stating that an unsuccessful bidder making a prima 
facie showing of arbitrary or capricious consideration 
of the bids by an agency will entitle such unsuccessful 
bidder to a hearing. The following cases cited by Ap-
pellant can summarily be disposed of and disregarded 
so far as standing in the case at bar is concerned: Scan-
well Laboratories v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 
424 F.2d 859 (1970); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Clafee, 
147 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306 (1971); M. 
Steinhal k Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 221, 
455 F.2d 1298 (1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing 
Co. v. Driver, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 433 F.2d 1137 
(1970); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 140 U.S. App. 
D.C. 98, 28 L.Ed. 2d 234, 433 F.2d 1204 (1970), cert, 
denied, 401 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1186 (1971); Simpson 
Electric Co. v. Seamans, 317 F . Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 
1970); Keco Ind. v. Laird, 318 F . Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 
1970); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. U.S., 356 F . 
Supp. 514 (D.C.E.D. Wash. 1973); Continental Busi-
ness Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct. CI. 
1971); and Curtiss-Wrgiht Corp. v. McLucas, 364 F . 
Supp. 750 (D.C.N.J. 1973). The above cited cases have 
no application in the case at hand because the decision 
in each and every one of those cases was based upon the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Section 500 
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et seq., and the contractors in those cases were held to 
have standing based upon the Judicial Review Section 
of said Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Section 701 et seq. The specific 
Section which applied in these cases was 5 U.S.C.A. Sec-
tion 702, which reads as follows: 
"A person suffering legal wrong because of 
agency action, or adversely affected or agrieved 
by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute is entitled to judicial review there-
of." Pub.L. 89-554. Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392. 
For example, the Court stated this to be the case in 
Scanwell Lab. and regarding standing said: 
"They may not base decisions on arbitrary or 
capricious abuses of discretion, however, and our 
holding here is that one who makes a prima facie 
showing alleging such action on the part of an 
agency or contracting officer has standing to sue 
under Section 10 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act." Scanwell Lab. v. Shaffer, supra, at 
p. 869. 
The statement of Appellant on page 14 of his brief 
to the effect that the case of Salt Lake City v. State, 
22 U.2d 37, 448 P.2d 350 (1968), held that a muni-
cipality in Utah may be bound by an implied contract, 
formed only from the conduct of the parties, is com-
pletely erroneous. In that case there had been an agree-
ment entered into and such is stated in the facts of the 
case. 
". . . the city fathers entered into an agreement 
with the leaders of the territorial government 
which was subsequently reduced to writing in the 
form of a series of documents including ordin-
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ances, statutes, and resolutions duly and regu-
larly enacted and passed." (Emphasis added) at 
p. 351. 
I t should further be noted that the Court states 
that the series of documents including ordinances, 
statutes and resolutions were duly and regularly enacted 
and passed. This writer would assume that what the 
Court said was that all formalities had been complied 
with. In fact the opinion sets out the agreement made 
and entered into as of the 25th day of October, A.D. 
1926 by and between Salt Lake City, a municipal corp-
oration of Utah, and the State of Utah, which contract 
was "duly executed". See, Salt Lake City v. State, 
supra, at p. 353. 
Therefore, Appellant's implication that the con-
tract was not countersigned by the City Recorder is also 
erroneous. The acts referred to by the Court when it 
stated: 
"The actual agreements reached by and between 
the two bodies politic must be determined from 
a consideration of all the documents available, to-
gether with the understanding of the parties as 
manifest by what was done in connection there-
with." (Emphasis added) Salt Lake City v. 
State, supra, at p 355, 
were the enacting of ordinances, statutes and resolutions 
and not actions which would create an implied contract, 
but a written contract which completely complied with 
all statutory requirements. 
This leaves Appellant with only one case (the 
Heyer Produtcs case) in support of his contention that 
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he has standing by virtue of an implied contract. This 
is the only case that this writer could find (and evidently 
the only one which Appellant could find) which holds 
that a bidder who is unsuccessful has obtained an im-
plied contract. As a matter of fact, only one out of four 
Judges in that case found the basis for standing to be 
an implied contract. Two Justices dissented in part and 
held that the Plaintiff in that case had standing based 
upon the fact that it was a claim founded upon an Act 
of Congress, but not upon the basis of an implied con-
tract. One Judge in dissenting in total stated: 
"If the officer acting on behalf of the Govern-
ment was guilty of the acts alleged in the peti-
tion, it would amount to fraud. A suit founded 
on fraud would sound in tort, and it is clear that 
this court has no jurisdiction of tort actions. 
Martilla v. United States, 118 Ct. CI. 177. The 
plaintiff, in order to recover, must show that he 
has a contract that he shall receive fair consider-
ation of his bid, or that a statute by its own 
terms authorizes his recovery in the event his bid 
does not receive fair consideration. Neither the 
facts nor the statutes involved justify a conclu-
sion that the Government made a contract with 
plaintiff to give him fair consideration. On the 
other hand, there is nothing in the statute which, 
by its own terms, would authorize the plaintiff 
to recover a judgment if the contracting officials 
had not given his bid fair consideration. Without 
one or the other basis, I cannot see how the court 
can render judgment for the plaintiff." Heyer 
Products Co. v. U.S., supra, at p. 414. 
Thus, it leaves Appellant with one Judge from the 
Court of Claims (not a very pursuasive authority) to 
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support his contention. The great weight of authority, 
in fact all authority found by this writer, except the 
Heyer case, is contrary. The case of Edelman v. Fed. 
Housing Admin., 382 F.2d 594 (1967), is a good ex-
ample and expressly holds contrary to the Heyer Pro-
ducts case and is a much better reasoned opinion. There-
in the Court stated: 
"Appellant seeks to avoid the statutory policy of 
governmental immunity clearly established in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680, by 
several arguments directed toward excluding the 
facts of this case from the operation of the Act. 
None of these claims can be accepted . . . (among 
these contentions) . . . Appellant contends that 
by advertising for bids, F H A obligated itself to 
give fair consideration to all bids, and that by 
allegedly favoring Tally's bid it did not give 
fair consideration to appellant's bid. In doing 
this, argues appellant, F H A breached an im-
plied contract with appellant entitling appellant 
to damages measured by his expense in preparing 
and submitting his bid. (See Heyer Products Co. 
v. United States, supra) The District Court, 
disagreeing with the Court of Claims decision in 
Heyer Products Co. v. United States, supra, 
held that this claim also sounded in tort. We do 
not find it necessary to reach this question. I t is 
apparent that if appellant were permitted to 
prove a breach of an implied contract of fair con-
sideration by showing that the entire auction was 
a sham, the effect would be to permit an unsuc-
cessful bidder to attach the auction on the grounds 
of fraud and mispresentation—a suit which, as we 
have pointed out, is doubly barred/' (Emphasis 
added) Edelman v. Fed. Housing Admin, supra, 
at p. 597. 
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The Court also said: 
"[IJ t is well established that an unsuccessful 
bidder has no standing in a suit to challenge the 
legality of the bidding procedure. . . . Bidding 
procedures are for the benefit of the public gen-
erally and confer no private right on the bidder. 
I t avails appellant nothing to assert that he is 
not an unsuccessful bidder because Tally's bid 
was void; this is the issue which he is barred from 
litigating. . . . The appellant never entered into 
a contract with the F H A . The invitation to bid 
specifically reserves to the FHA the absolute 
right to decline to enter into a contract with any 
bidder. Regardless of whether or not Tally's bid 
was valid, there was no contract of sale with ap-
pellant because the F H A never accepted appel-
lant's bid." (Emphasis added) Edelman v. Fed. 
Housing Admin., supra, at p. 597. 
In stating that any contract theory to the effect that 
bidding and all aspects of the sale would fairly be 
conducted, the Court stated: 
"Furthermore, in order to recover on a contract 
theory, appellant would have to prove an implied 
contract with the F H A to the effect that the 
agency would fairly conduct all aspects of the 
auction, including guaranteeing to each prospec-
tive bidder, equal access to all relevant informa-
tion. I t can hardly be contended on the facts of 
this case (which facts were very similar to the 
case at hand) that the F H A entered into such a 
broad contract. What appellant seeks is judicial 
review of an allegedly improper sale by the FHA 
and there is no question that the courts do not 
possess that power. Gart v. Cole, 166 F . Supp. 
129 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd. 263 F.2d 244 (2 Cir. 
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1958) ; Choy v. Faragut Gardens 1, Inc., 131 F . 
Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). I t follows that the 
complaint was properly dismissed." (Emphasis 
added) Edelman v. Fed. Housing Admin., supra, 
at p. 597, 598. 
Other cases citing Edelman and holding to the same 
effect are: 
Jones v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 334 F . 
Supp. 739 (1971) at p. 744; I-Ridge Lumber 
Co. v. U.S., 443 F.2d 452 (1971) at p. 456; 
Gary Aircraft Corp. v. U.S., 342 F . Supp. 473 
(1972) at p. 477. 
Even if the Heyer Products case were pursuasive 
authority, it does not give any comfort to the Appellant 
in the case at hand. The implied contract which the 
Court held was created by the acts of the parties was 
only to the effect: 
" I t was an implied condition of the request for 
offers that each of them would be honestly con-
sidered, and that the offer which in the honest 
opinion of the contracting officer was the most 
advantageous to the Government would be ac-
cepted." Heyer Products Co. v. U.S., supra, at 
p. 412. 
''Among these rights is the right to have its bid 
honestly considered. The Government is under 
the obligation to honestly consider it and not to 
wantonly disregard it. If this obligation is 
breached and plaintiff is put to needless expense 
in preparing its bid, it is entitled to recover such 
expense." (Emphasis added) Heyer Products 
Co. v. U.S., supra, at p. 413. 
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The only obligation which the Court found in the 
Heyer Products case was that the bid be honestly and 
fairly considered, that it would not be wantonly dis-
regarded and that if it was the bid which was the most 
advantageous to the Government, it would be accepted. 
After the case was referred back to the Trial Court and 
judgment was given to the Government, the case was 
again appealed and in that appeal the Court stated: 
"So the question before us is, was the plaintiff's 
bid rejected in good faith or arbitrarily or cap-
riciously? If its rejection was not fraudulent nor 
arbitrary nor capricious nor so unreasonable as 
to necessarily imply bad faith, plaintiff has estab-
lished no right to recovery." Heyer Products Co. 
V. U.S., 177 F . Supp. 251 (1959), at p. 252. 
The question then was whether the plaintiff's bid was 
the most advantageous to the government or not, and if 
not there was no breach of warranty under the implied 
contract. The Trial Court found that Heyer Products 
Co. bid was defective and was not the most advantageous 
to the Government, therefore, the Court of Claims held: 
"We cannot say that OTAC did not act in good 
faith in deciding that Weidenhoff's bid was the 
one most advantageous to the Government. Cer-
tainly we cannot say that the rejection of plain-
tiff's bid was arbitrary or capricious or lacking 
in good faith. 
I t results that plaintiff's petition must be dis-
missed." Heyer Products Co., Inc. v. U.S., supra, 
at p. 257. 
Salt Lake City certainly did give fair consideration to 
all bids which were received and accepted that bid which 
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was most advantageous to the City and the taxpayers 
thereof. Appellant does not contend that the lowest bid 
was defective in any way or that it was nonresponsive 
to the request for bids. I t is his contention that in spite 
of that fact that the lowest bid was $108,888.00 lower 
than his, it was his bid that should have been accepted 
because the lowest bidder had a competitive advantage. 
In every bidding procedure there is undoubtedly a com-
petitive advantage to one bidder or another. Such 
things as better buying ability, goods purchased pre-
viously at a lower price, etc., may allow one bidder to 
bid at a lower price allowing that bidder a competitive 
advantage. A contractor may even bid a job at a loss 
in order to keep his force employed. A claim cannot in 
any event be based upon the fact that a competitor had 
an advantage, but only upon whether his bid was the 
lowest responsible bid or not. In the case at bar, Appel-
lant does not contend that his bid was the lowest re-
sponsible bid and it is for this reason that the Heyer 
Products case lends no comfort to the Appellant in this 
case. 
While the Court in the Heyer Products Co. case 
never discussed the problem of consideration for the im-
plied contract, it would be the allegation of this writer 
that there was none. As previously discussed, the only 
consideration which this writer could possibly find in 
the Heyer case, on the part of defendant, was its prom-
ise to give fair consideration to the bid submitted by 
Heyer. That obligation was placed upon the defendant 
by virtue of 41 U.S.C.A. Sec. 152(b), (said Section 
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has since been repealed and is now covered by 2305 of 
Title 10), which required that the award of contracts 
be given to the bidder who: "will be the most advantag-
eous to the government." Since the United States was 
already obligated by law to consider the bids fairly, it 
could not be consideration for the subsequent claimed 
implied contract. Doing an act which a party is already 
obligated to do cannot constitute consideration for a 
promise or an action on the part of the other party. 
VanTassell v. Lewis, 118 U. 356, 222 P.2d 350 (1950). 
P O I N T IV 
T H E G R E A T W E I G H T O F A U T H O R I T Y IS 
CONTRARY TO HEFER PRODUCTS CO. 
A N D H O L D S T H A T A D V E R T I S I N G F O R 
A N D R E C E I V I N G B I D S C R E A T E S NO IM-
P L I E D CONTRACT, A N D T H A T A R E -
J E C T E D B I D D E R H A S NO S T A N D I N G . 
The rules governing bidding for public contracts 
are analegeous to the rules governing auction sales. 
That is, an ordinary advertisement for bids or tender 
is not itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer 
which creates no rights until accepted. Levinson v. U.S., 
258 U.S. 198, 66 L.Ed. 563, 42 S. Ct. 275 (1972); 
U.S. v. Conti, 119 F.2d 652 (1941); Weitz v. Inde-
pendent Dist., 79 la. 423, 44 N.W. 696 (1890); Cedar 
Rapids Lum. Co. v. Fisher, 129 la. 332, 105 N.W. 595 
(1906); Cole County v. Central Mo. Tr. Co., 302 Mo. 
222, 257 S.W. 774 (1924); Straw v. Williamsport, 286 
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Pa. 41, 132 A. 804 (1926); O'Dowd v. Waters, 130 
S.C. 232, 125 S.E. 644 (1924); Bromley v. McHugh, 
122 Wash. 361, 210 P . 809 (1922); Escote Mfg. Co. 
v. U.S., 169 F . Supp. 483 (1959); Beirne v. Alaska 
State Housing Authority, 454 P.2d 262 (1969); Uni-
versal Const. Co. v. Arizona Console. Masonary, etc., 
93 Ariz. 4, 377 P.2d 1017 (1963); O. C. Kinney, Inc. 
v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 151 Colo. 571, 397 P.2d 628 
(1963). 
Even though the charter of a municipality or a 
state statute expressly requires that a contract shall be 
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, a contract is 
not formed until the lowest bid is in fact accepted. 
Farrell v. Bd. of Ed., 10 N.J . Misc. 88, 157 A. 656 
(1932); In re. Summitt Hill School Dir's. Removal, 
289 Pa. 82, 137 A. 143 (1927); Arthur Venneri Co. v. 
Housing Auth. of City of Patterson, 29 N.J . 392, 149 
A.2d 228 (1959). Even after acceptance of the bid, no 
contract is formed until the requisite formality has been 
complied with. Covington v. Basich Bros. Const. Co., 
72 Ariz. 280, 233 P.2d 837 (1951); Berkeley Unified 
School Dist. v. James I. Barnes Const. Co., 112 F . 
Supp. 396, (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1953); Franklin Snow Co. 
v. Commonwealth, 303 Mass. 511, 22 N.E.2d 559 
(1939); Wayne Crouse, Inc. v. School Dist. of Brad-
dock, 341 Pa. 497,19 A.2d 843 (1941). 
Advertising for bids is nothing more than a solicita-
tion of bids for doing the work and does not itself im-
port any contractual obligation. William A. Berbusse, 
Jr., Inc. v.North Broward Hospital Dist., (Fla. App.) 
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117 So. 2d 550 (1960); Anderson v. Public Schools, 
122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W. 610 (1894). Advertisement is a 
mere invitation to enter into a bargain rather than an 
offer. O'Keefe v. Lee Calan Imports, Inc., 128 111. 
App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 758 (1970). An unsuccess-
ful bidder even if he be the lowest bidder cannot main-
tain an action at law against the local government for 
its failure to grant him a contract. Talbot Paving Co. 
V. Detroit, 109 Mich. 647, 67 N.W. 979 (1896). The 
lowest bidder cannot maintain an action because in-
vitation to bid is merely solicitation to offer and not an 
offer itself. Malen Const. Corp. v. Bd. of County Road 
Comm. of Wayne County, 187 F . Supp. 937 (1960). 
The courts theorize that bidding and the provisions of 
bid statutes are intended for the benefit of the local 
government and its taxpayers not for the benefit of 
disappointed bidders. General Steel Products Corp. v. 
New York City, 187 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1959); Thatcher 
Chemical Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra; Malloy 
V. New Rochelle, 198 N.Y. 402, 92 N.E. 94 (1910); 
Kayfield Construction Corp. v. Morris, 15 A.D.2d 373, 
225 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1962); U.S. v. Purcell Envelope 
Co., 249 U.S. 313, 63 L.Ed. 620, 39 S.Ct. 300 (1919) ; 
Somers Const. Co., Inc. v. Board of Ed. for Southern 
Gloucester County Regional High School Dist., 198 
F . Supp. 732 (1961). The New York court observed: 
"[The petitioner] did not obtain a vested or prop-
erty interest in the contract merely by reason of 
the fact that it submitted the lowest bid." Kay-
field Const. Corp. v. Morris, supra, at p. 514. 
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The Alabama Court added: 
"The provision for letting the contract to the 
lowest responsible bidder is for the benefit of the 
public and does not confer on a bidder any right 
enforceable at law or in equity." Townsend v. 
McCall, 262 Ala. 554, 80 So. 2d 262, 265 (1955). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
"The purpose of a system of competitive bidding 
tends to improve competition, to guard against 
favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud 
and corruption in the awarding of municipal 
contracts, and secure the best work or supplies at 
the lowest price practicable, and such a system is 
designed for the benefit of the citizens and tax-
payers and the public interest generally'' (Em-
phasis added) Thatcher Chemical Co. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., supra, at p. 771, 
P O I N T V 
A P P E L L A N T IS C H A R G E D W I T H CON-
S T R U C T I V E N O T I C E O F T H E T E R M S O F 
T H E CONTRACT I T CLAIMS S H O U L D 
H A V E B E E N D I S C L O S E D TO A P P E L L A N T 
P R I O R TO B I D D I N G . 
Appellant's claim is based upon the provisions of 
a contract which was public record and open to inspec-
tion of any interested person. Respondent, Salt Lake 
City, did not attempt to hide any material facts from 
Appellant, nor did it take any devious action. Appel-
lant does not allege any irregularities in the contract 
nor does he allege that it was improper in any way. His 
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sole allegation is that the contents of that contract 
should have been disclosed by the City to Appellant. 
The Salt Lake City Recorder is required by law to 
". . . maintain a record of all contracts, properly in-
dexed, which record shall be open to inspection of all 
interested persons." Sec. 10-10-61, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended. 
Such record is constructive notice of the contents 
of any contract and for that reason the City is not 
obliged to disclose information contained therein. 
CONCLUSION 
Within the facts of the case at hand there could 
be no implied contract. The determination of whether 
there is an implied contract is a legal matter which the 
court based upon the foregoing authorities should find 
to the negative. There can be no implied contract be-
cause the required formalities of contracting with Salt 
Lake City have not been met. This alleged contract 
was in excess of $150 and was not approved by the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City nor was it 
countersigned by the City Recorder, both defects which 
will cause any contract to be void. Further there was no* 
consideration given by Salt Lake City to the Appellant 
and the contract must fail for want thereof. 
Mere solicitation for bids is not an offer and for 
this reason no contract can be formed. A contract, in 
order to be binding and have any effect and force, must 
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have an offer, an acceptance and consideration. The 
alleged implied contract lacks two of the three require-
ments. 
If Appellant were allowed to maintain a suit upon 
an implied contract he would be allowed to do that which 
the Utah Legislature saw fit to prohibit, i.e., to sue for 
misrepresentations, which is a tort action and barred by 
Governmental immunity. 
As the Court stated in Edelman v. FHA, 251 F . 
Supp. 715 (1966), at p. 717: 
"In spite of the fact, however, that Edelman 
claims in his complaint that he has a contract with 
the F H A , it is crystal clear that he has no such 
contract. The court is not bound by the conclu-
sions of the pleader and will not permit the essen-
tial character of the suit to be disguised or dis-
torted by the 'artful drafting of a complaint.' 
Actually Edelman is in the position of an 'un-
successful bidder' and as such he has no standing 
to sue." 
Even if an implied contract were allowed, it must 
follow that such contract could in no way be broad 
enough to include the implied promise that the City 
would fairly conduct all aspects of the bidding. I t 
could only be found that the City impliedly promised 
to give fair and honest consideration to plaintiff's bid; 
that it would not wantonly disregard it; that if plain-
tiff's bid were the lowest responsible bid, it would be 
accepted. This Salt Lake City did. Plaintiff's bid was 
not the lowest bid. In fact, it was $108,888.00 higher 
than the bid which was accepted. I t follows that Salt 
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Lake City did give its fairest consideration to Appel-
lant's bid and rejected it because it was not the lowest re-
sponsible bid. Salt Lake City accepted that bid which 
was the most advantageous to the government, the tax-
payers, and all concerned. 
Since there can be no implied contract, this action 
is an action in tort which is barred by the governmental 
immunity doctrine inasmuch as the Legislature has not 
seen fit, under the facts in this case, to waive immunity 
under the Governmental Immunity Act. For this rea-
son, it is urged that this Court affirm the decision of the 
lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J A C K L. C R E L L I N 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
O. W A L L A C E E A R L 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake 
City Corporation 
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A P P E N D I X 
Notice mailed to Contractor's Association 
NOTICE TO CONTRACTORS 
Sealed proposals will be received at the office of the City Recorder, 
Room 200, City and County Building, until 5:00 o'clock P.M., Wednesday, 
May 16, 1973 for the work of constructing an In-Flight Kitchen at the Salt 
Lake City International Airport, Project No. 19A-52, according to the plans 
on file in the City Engineer's office. 
Bids will be publicly opened in Room 301, City and County Building at or 
about 10:30 A.M. on Thursday, May 17, 1973, by the Board of City Commissioners. 
In lieu of submitting proposals to the City Recorder, bidders may present 
sealed proposals to the Board of Commissioners at open meeting on said date of 
bi d opening prior to the opening of the first bid. 
Instruction to bidders, specifications and forms for contract and bond, 
together with plans and profiles, when prepared, may be obtained at the 
office of the City Engineer, Room 401, City & County Building. 
On the outside of envelope, the bidder shall indicate the nature of the bid. 
The right is reserved to reject any or all bids. 
Bid bonds will be accepted in lieu of certified check. 
BY ORDER OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THIS 26th 
DAY of-April
 1973. 
HERMAN J. HOGENSEN 
City Recorder 
First Publication April 30, 1973 
Last Publication May 4, 1973 
(MAILED - April 26, 1973) 
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Notice pub l i shed in Desere t News 
NOTICI TO CONTRACTORS 
of tht offlct of tht City Rtcordtr, 
Room 200, City ond County Build-
ing, until 5:00 o'clock P.M., 
Wtdntsdoy, Moy 16, 1*73, for tht 
work of constructing on In-Fllght 
Kttchtn at tht Solt Lokt City In-
tornotlonol Airport, Proltct No. 
19A-52, according to tht plont on 
flit In tht City Engmttr's offlct. 
Bids will bt publicly optntd In 
Room 301, City ond County Build-
ing at or about 10:30 A.M. on 
Thursday, Moy 17, 1973, by tht 
Board of City Commissioners. 
In lltu of submlfflna proposals 
to tht City Rtcordtr, bMdtrs may 
prtstnt staltd proposals to tht 
Board of Commissioners at optn 
mtttlng on sold daft of bid optn-
Ino prior to tht optnlno of tht 
first bid. 
Instruction to Mddtrs, sptclfica-
ttons and forms for contract and 
bond, toptthtr wtth plans ond pro-
flits, whtn prtportd, may bt ©b» 
talntd at tht offlct of tht City 
Englnttr, Room 401, City & Coun-
ty Building. 
On tht outsldt of tnvtlopt, tht 
bMdtr shall indicate tht naturt of 
tht bid. 
Tht right Is rtstrvtd to rtltct 
any or all bids. 
Bid bonds will bt 
lltu of ctrttfltd chtck. 
BY ORDER OF T H E BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS OF SALT 
L A K E CITY, UTAH, THIS 26TH 
DAY OF APRIL, 1973. 
HERMAN J . HOOENSEN 
atyr 
First Publication April 30,1973 
Last PubticotJon Moy 4,1973 
(C-74) 
MAILED MAY 1 , 1973 rh 
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